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Unresolved Issues in the Law on Penalties 
Andrew Summers1 
For citation please use: [2017] LMCLQ (forthcoming) 
The article examines several unresolved issues in the law on penalties, following the UK 
Supreme Court’s restatement of the penalties rule in Makdessi v Cavendish Square 
Holding [2015] UKSC 67. The discussion is divided into three main sections, concerning: the 
jurisdiction (or scope) of the rule; the test for the validity of impugned clauses; and the 
effect of the rule. The central argument is that although the court’s decision to limit the 
rule’s application at both the jurisdiction and validity stages will increase parties’ certainty 
that their clauses will be enforced, the restatement leaves the law itself uncertain in several 
key respects. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The dust has now had time to settle following the Supreme Court’s restatement of the 
rule against penalties in Makdessi v Cavendish Square Holdings.2 Yet several issues 
remain unresolved. The focus of analysis to date has been on what the court did decide;3 
by contrast, this article addresses the various issues that are likely to require further 
decision. In holding that the penalties rule survives, albeit in a narrowed form, it has 
been suggested that the Supreme Court “espoused tests that are clear and workable”.4 
This article takes a different view. Although it was perhaps inevitable that the Supreme 
Court’s restatement would not be entirely comprehensive, Makdessi creates new 
uncertainties. The decision to narrow the rule at both the jurisdiction and validity stages 
will increase parties’ certainty that their clauses will be enforced, but the restatement 
leaves the law itself less clear than before. 
The structure of the article reflects the three separate stages involved in applying 
the penalties rule: jurisdiction, validity and effect.5 Taking each stage in turn, the article 
offers a very brief overview of the issues that were settled in Makdessi (for better or 
worse), followed by a more detailed analysis of the issues that were left unresolved. The 
                                                        
1 Assistant Professor of Law, LSE. 
2 Makdessi v Cavendish Square Holdings BV [2015] UKSC 67, [2015] 3 WLR 1373 (hereafter “Makdessi”). 
3 See, recently, J Fisher, “Rearticulating the Rule Against Penalty Clauses” [2016] LMCLQ 169; F Dawson, 
‘Determining Penalties as a Matter of Construction’ [2016] LMCLQ 207; J Morgan, “The Penalty Clause 
Doctrine: Unlovable but Untouchable” [2016] CLJ 11; C Conte, “The Penalty Rule Revisited” (2016) 132 
LQR 382. 
4 Conte (n3) 385. 
5 This terminology is gratefully adopted from Carmine Conte. The first two stages have not always been 
distinguished clearly in the authorities, but they were correctly separated in the judgment of Lord 
Neuberger and Lord Sumption in Makdessi [12]-[18] (jurisdiction) and [19]-[35] (validity). 
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common theme running through this analysis is that while the new tests for jurisdiction 
and validity were superficially clear, on closer inspection all that can really be said with 
certainty is that they are narrower than before. The key concepts upon which the new 
tests rely are seriously flawed, even on their own terms, and in this respect they open 
the door to further litigation in a suitable case. 
On the jurisdiction stage, we now know that the penalties rule survives, that its 
application depends on breach (and so can be circumvented by careful drafting), and 
that it extends beyond payments of money. But several key issues may require further 
decision. These include the application of the “substance over form” test for determining 
whether a clause is triggered by breach; the unworkable distinction between 
“conditional primary obligations” and “secondary obligations”; and the application of the 
jurisdiction test to clauses that provide for the retention of property or money upon 
breach. Although it is clear that the new jurisdiction test is narrower than the old breach 
requirement, its application on the facts of Makdessi itself foreshadows the difficulties 
that are likely to be faced. 
On the validity stage, we now know that a clause may be upheld even though it was 
not a genuine pre-estimate of loss, and even though it aimed to deter breach; instead, 
validity now centres on the interrelated concepts of legitimate interest, exorbitance and 
unconscionability. However, new uncertainties have been created by importing the 
concept of a “legitimate interest” into the law of penalties. In particular: legitimate 
interest in what? -and whose legitimate interest? Though the answers to these questions 
appeared clear enough in the abstract, they fell apart in application to the ParkingEye 
appeal.6 Further unresolved issues include the scope of the new dichotomy between 
legitimate interest and punishment and the appropriate weight for procedural 
considerations. 
On the effect of the rule, the decision in Makdessi plays an important clarificatory 
role in settling that a penalty clause is wholly unenforceable. Contrary to some previous 
authorities, the court is not empowered to rewrite the parties’ bargain by “scaling down” 
the clause. However, an important consequence of this development, so far under-
appreciated in analyses of the decision, is that the “all-or-nothing” approach to 
enforceability further raises the stakes at the jurisdiction and validity stages. In practice, 
the rule’s newly sharpened teeth make it less likely that it will successfully be invoked. 
Only the very limited (and distinct) scope of the rule for relief against forfeiture provides 
any chance of a “compromise” position. 
                                                        




A. What we know 
We know that the rule against penalties survives. Despite acknowledging some 
misgivings,7 the panel of seven Justices in Makdessi unanimously declined to abrogate 
the rule altogether.8 Nor would the court countenance any formal exception for 
commercial transactions.9 Although the survival of the penalties rule evidently owes 
something to judicial conservatism,10 the court also cited the need to protect parties 
from the risks of inequality of bargaining power in circumstances not covered by 
legislation.11 Such justifications were already well-known prior to Makdessi, as were the 
countervailing considerations of certainty and freedom of contract. This normative 
equation is unaltered by the Supreme Court’s decision and will no-doubt continue to be 
debated.12 
We now also know that the penalties rule only applies to clauses triggered by 
breach.13 In other words, the rule regulates only the remedies available for breach of a 
party’s primary obligations, not the primary obligations themselves.14 Although this was 
commonly assumed to be the position in English law before Makdessi,15 express 
authority had been surprisingly thin.16 The breach requirement had recently been 
                                                        
7 Makdessi [3] and [36] (Lord Neuberger and Lord Sumption) and [258]-[259] (Lord Hodge). 
8 Makdessi [36]-[39] (Lord Neuberger and Lord Sumption), [162]-[167] (Lord Mance) and [261]-[266] 
(Lord Hodge). This conclusion was fortified by the existence of equivalent rules in other common law and 
civil jurisdictions: Makdessi [37] (Lord Neuberger and Lord Sumption), [164]-[166] (Lord Mance) and 
[263]-[265] (Lord Hodge). 
9 Makdessi [168] (Lord Mance) and [267] (Lord Hodge). However, where the transaction is between 
commercial parties of equal bargaining power, there is a “strong presumption” of validity: see further text 
to n209. 
10 Makdessi [162] (Lord Mance): “there would have to be shown the strongest reasons for so radical a 
reversal of jurisprudence which goes back over a century”. See also [36] (Lord Neuberger and Lord 
Sumption). 
11 Makdessi [38] (Lord Neuberger and Lord Sumption), [167] (Lord Mance) and [262] (Lord Hodge). 
Another justification offered was the consistency of the rule with several well-established equitable 
doctrines such as “relief from forfeiture, the equity of redemption, and refusal to grant specific 
performance”: [39] (Lord Neuberger and Lord Sumption). 
12 Fisher (n3) 175: “This case is unlikely to change the minds of those who think the penalty rule is 
irrational, arbitrary and overdue for abolition”. See eg S Worthington, “Penalties and Agreed Damages 
Clauses” in G Virgo and S Worthington (eds), Commercial Remedies: Resolving Controversies (CUP, 2016) 
(forthcoming). 
13 Makdessi [12]-[14] (Lord Neuberger and Lord Sumption), [129] (Lord Mance) and [239] (Lord Hodge). 
14 Makdessi [13] (Lord Neuberger and Lord Sumption). Lord Hodge also adopted the requirement that the 
rule “applied only in relation to secondary obligations” ([241]). 
15 McGregor regarded this proposition as “self-evident”: H McGregor, McGregor on Damages, 19th edn 
(Sweet & Maxwell, 2014) [15-009]. 
16 In Export Credits Guarantee Department v Universal Oil Products Co [1983] 1 WLR 399 (HL) 402, Lord 
Roskill stated the breach requirement expressly, but as Lord Mance put it “the facts of that case were quite 
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abandoned by the High Court of Australia.17 The Supreme Court concluded that the 
breach requirement had strong historical roots originating in the equitable treatment of 
penal defeasible bonds,18 and reflected the “fundamental difference between a 
jurisdiction to review the fairness of a contractual obligation and a jurisdiction to 
regulate the remedy for its breach”.19 
It follows from the breach requirement that the restated rule against penalties can 
still be “circumvented by careful drafting”.20 Whilst acknowledging that there may be 
“capricious consequences of this state of affairs”,21 the Supreme Court was ultimately 
unmoved by this objection.22 Although the restriction might turn on a “somewhat formal 
distinction”, it was justified given that the rule was already an “inroad upon freedom of 
contract”.23 Lord Mance was the only Justice to attempt a justification of the breach 
requirement in more than formalistic terms, denying that the requirement was “without 
rational or logical underpinning” and asserting instead that it reflected “a real 
distinction, legal and psychological”.24 
The penalties rule can extend beyond “classic”25 clauses requiring payment of 
money on breach. The application to other clauses had already been established in a 
piecemeal fashion by earlier authorities,26 but Makdessi puts this proposition on a surer 
footing, both at the jurisdiction stage and by rejecting the genuine pre-estimate of loss 
test of validity.27 It was a short step from the classic clause to accept that the penalties 
                                                                                                                                                                             
special”: Makdessi [129]. See also Alder v Moore [1961] 2 QB 57 (CA) 70-71 (Devlin LJ), dissenting; Jervis v 
Harris [1996] Ch 195 (CA) 206 (Millett LJ); Imam-Sadeque (n16) [191] (Popplewell J). In Bridge v Campbell 
Discount Co Ltd [1962] AC 600 (HL) 629-630, Lord Denning robustly rejected the breach requirement. 
17 Andrews v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (2012) 247 CLR 205 (HCA). 
18 Makdessi [13] and [42]. See also [241] (Lord Hodge). Lord Neuberger and Lord Sumption rebuffed the 
High Court of Australia’s contrary historical account of the penalties rule, holding ([42]) that “although the 
reasoning in Andrews was entirely historical, it is not in fact consistent with the equitable rule as it 
developed historically”. 
19 Makdessi [13]. 
20 Makdessi [257] (Lord Hodge). See also [14] (Lord Neuberger and Lord Sumption). 
21 Makdessi [15] (Lord Neuberger and Lord Sumption). 
22 Makdessi [43] (Lord Neuberger and Lord Sumption), [130] and [162] (Lord Mance) and [258] (Lord 
Hodge). Cf Bridge (n16) 629 (Lord Denning): “Let no one mistake the injustice of this. It means that equity 
commits itself to this absurd paradox: it will grant relief to a man who breaks his contract but will penalise 
the man who keeps it”. 
23 Makdessi [43] (Lord Neuberger and Lord Sumption), citing Else (1982) v Parkland Holdings [1994] 1 
BCLC 130 (CA) 145 (Hoffmann LJ). 
24 Makdessi [130]. 
25 Makdessi [16] (Lord Neuberger and Lord Sumption). 
26 See eg Gilbert Ash (Northern) Ltd v Modern Engineering (Bristol) Ltd [1974] AC 689 (HL) 698 (Lord 
Reid), 703 (Lord Morris), 711 (Viscount Dilhorne) and 723 (Lord Salmon); Jobson v Johnson [1989] 1 WLR 
1026 (CA) 1034-1035 (Dillon LJ) and 1042 (Nicholls LJ); Workers Trust & Merchant Bank Ltd v Dojap 
Investments Ltd [1993] AC 573 (PC) 579 (Lord Browne-Wilkinson); Else (n23) 138 (Evans LJ); General 
Trading Co (Holdings) Ltd v Richmond Corp Ltd [2008] EWHC 1479 (Comm) [113] (Beatson J). 
27 Makdessi [222] (Lord Hodge). See further text to n132. 
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rule could, in principle, also apply to transfers (or re-transfers) of property upon 
breach.28 Subject to the breach requirement, a clause withholding payments of money 
otherwise due to the contract-breaker can also potentially fall within the jurisdiction of 
the penalties rule.29 The retention of a deposit paid as “surety” for performance may also 
be subject to the penalties rule,30 although such clauses will not be invalid merely 
because they aimed to deter breach.31 
B. Unresolved issues 
i) Applying substance over form 
Makdessi establishes that the breach requirement “depends on the substance of the term 
and not on its form or on the label which the parties have chosen to attach to it”.32 
However, the decision leaves the application of the substance over form test unresolved. 
The test potentially empowers judges to hold that a clause was substantially triggered 
by breach even though the clause was drafted (perhaps intentionally) to avoid creating a 
relevant obligation. On the other hand, the test must also be reconciled with the 
concession that the penalties rule can be circumvented by careful drafting.33 Various 
approaches are possible. “Substance over form” may be understood as an application of 
the sham standard, or it may be subsumed within the ordinary process of contractual 
construction, or it may convey a more intrusive standard. 
The first possibility would be to apply the sham standard. An agreement is a 
“sham” where both parties intend to give “the appearance of creating between the 
parties legal rights and obligations different from the actual legal rights and obligations 
(if any) which the parties intend to create”.34 However, applying this approach, the 
substance over form test would deny “circumvention by careful drafting” in the very 
circumstances where circumvention is least objectionable: that is, where both parties 
were deliberately aiming to avoid the penalties rule. The sham standard serves to 
                                                        
28 Makdessi [16] and [84] (Lord Neuberger and Lord Sumption), [170] and [183] (Lord Mance) and [230] 
and [233] (Lord Hodge). 
29 Makdessi [154]-[156] and [170] (Lord Mance) and [226] and [228] (Lord Hodge), with whom Lord 
Clarke and Lord Toulson agreed. Lord Neuberger and Lord Sumption were “prepared to assume, without 
deciding” this point: [73]. Cf [258], where Lord Hodge accepted that the penalties rule could be 
circumvented by redrafting a clause in terms of “instalments conditional upon performance”. 
30 Makdessi [16] (Lord Neuberger and Lord Sumption), [156] (Lord Mance) and [237]-[238] (Lord Hodge). 
31 See further text to n135. 
32 Makdessi [15] (Lord Neuberger and Lord Sumption), adding that one must establish “the real nature of 
the transaction” rather than “intention as expressed in the agreement”, citing Bridge (n16) 622 (Lord 
Radcliffe). See also Makdessi [258] (Lord Hodge). 
33 n20. 
34 Snook v London and West Riding Investments Ltd [1967] 2 QB 786 (CA) 802 (Diplock LJ) See further M 
Conaglen, “Sham Trusts” [2008] Cambridge Law Journal 176, 183-192. 
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protect specific public policy objectives that override freedom of contract; it is less well-
suited to the penalties rule, which retains respect for freedom of contract as a relevant 
constraint on the jurisdiction of the rule.35 
The second possibility would be to regard the substance over form test as part of 
the ordinary process of contractual construction. The test would then merely emphasise 
that the distinction between primary and secondary obligations is not determined 
exclusively by the literal wording of the clause.36 In Makdessi, the construction approach 
appears to be reflected in Lord Neuberger and Lord Sumption’s test of whether the 
clause in question creates “(expressly or impliedly) an obligation to perform”.37 On this 
view, a clause that initially appears to impose a conditional primary obligation may 
nevertheless be construed as a secondary obligation arising on breach, having regard to 
the whole contract and available background.38 
Several cases prior to Makdessi exemplify the importance of construing the 
impugned clause in light of the contract as a whole. In M & J Polymers v Imerys Minerals, 
Burton J held that a “take or pay” clause fell within the jurisdiction of the penalties 
rule.39 Although the conditions for payment under the clause were not expressed to be 
dependent on breach, they mirrored the obligations set out in another clause of the 
contract and thus substantially fell within the scope of the rule.40 Similarly, in General 
Trading v Richmond Corp, Beatson J held that “The sale and purchase agreement in this 
case cannot be construed as a contract for the sale … at two alternative prices” because 
“Such a construction is wholly inconsistent with the structure” of the other clauses in the 
contract.41 
The concept of a “disguised penalty” may also be brought within the ordinary 
construction approach. This concept was first raised by Bingham LJ in Interfoto Picture 
Library v Stiletto Visual Programmes,42 and was subsequently adopted by Lord Hodge in 
Makdessi.43 Neither Interfoto nor Makdessi provide any detailed explanation of the 
concept. However, in Euro London v Claessens International, Chadwick LJ suggested that 
                                                        
35 Makdessi [13] (Lord Neuberger and Lord Sumption): “Leaving aside challenges going to the reality of 
consent … the courts do not review the fairness of men’s bargains”. 
36 An analogous approach has been taken in relation to the designation of a clause as a “condition” for the 
purposes of termination: Schuler AG v Wickman Machine Tool Sales Ltd [1974] AC 235 (HL) 251-252 (Lord 
Reid), 258-229 (Lord Morris), 265 (Lord Simon) and 270-271 (Lord Kilbrandon). 
37 Makdessi [14] (emphasis added) (Lord Neuberger and Lord Sumption). 
38 Investors Compensation Scheme Ltd v West Bromwich Building Society [1998] 1 WLR 896 (HL) 912 (Lord 
Hoffmann). 
39 M & J Polymers Ltd v Imerys Minerals Ltd [2008] EWHC 344 (Comm), [2008] 1 CLC 276. Burton J also 
gave the example ([41]) that “a minimum payment clause in a hire purchase agreement can be held to be a 
penalty, even though expressed as a claim in debt”. 
40 M & J Polymers (n39) [39]-[44]. Cf Euro London Appointments Ltd v Claessens International Ltd [2006] 
EWCA Civ 385, [2006] 2 Lloyd's Rep 436 [18]-[22] and [28] (Chadwick LJ). 
41 General Trading (n26) [116]. 
42 Interfoto Picture Library Ltd v Stiletto Visual Programmes Ltd [1989] QB 433 (CA) 445-446. 
43 Makdessi [258]. 
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“In referring to the clause as “a disguised penalty clause”, Lord Justice Bingham was 
pointing out that, if that was the true nature of the bargain, the clause could not be taken 
outside the rule against penalties by presenting the charge as a “holding fee””.44 On this 
understanding, a “disguised penalty” merely reinforces the proposition that when 
construing the relevant clause, the parties’ literal wording (taken in isolation) is not 
conclusive. 
Under the ordinary process of construction, the scope of the penalties rule would 
nevertheless be constrained by the rule of interpretation that the court is bound to apply 
the parties’ “unambiguous language”.45 In other words, if a clause was unambiguously 
drafted to ensure that it was not triggered by any breach of contract (even when read 
together with the other contractual terms) then it would be immune from the penalties 
rule. This approach fits with the proposition that the penalties rule can be circumvented 
by careful drafting. Indeed, without this constraint on the scope of judicial intervention, 
it is hard to see how the substance test can be reconciled with the concession in 
Makdessi that the breach requirement is essentially “formalistic in its application”.46 
The third possibility is that the substance over form test conveys a more intrusive 
standard. In Makdessi, Lord Hodge specified that parties could not circumvent the 
penalties rule where “the substance of the contractual arrangement is the imposition of 
punishment for breach of contract”.47 Similarly, Lord Neuberger and Lord Sumption held 
that if a clause was a “disguised punishment … for breach, it would make no difference 
that it was expressed as part of the formula for determining the consideration”.48 These 
statements appear to go beyond anything one might recognise as part of the ordinary 
process of construction. They also blur the distinction between jurisdiction and validity, 
such that the question of punishment becomes relevant at both stages.49 The concept of 
punishment is itself difficult to define.50 
Previous authorities had alluded to a more intrusive substance over form test. In 
OFT v Abbey National, Lord Phillips held (obiter) that “the banks could not convert what 
were in effect penalties into “price” simply by wording their contracts so as to ensure 
that the contingencies that triggered liability to pay the charges did not constitute 
breaches of contract”.51 Similarly, in Imam Sadeque v Bluebay Asset Management, 
Popplewell J held that “It would not be possible to avoid the application of the [penalties 
                                                        
44 Euro London (n40) [27]. 
45 Rainy Sky SA v Kookmin Bank [2011] UKSC 50, [2011] 1 WLR 2900 [23] (Lord Clarke); Arnold v Britton 
[2015] UKSC 36, [2015] AC 1619 (Lord Neuberger) [17]-[20]. 
46 Makdessi [40] (Lord Neuberger and Lord Sumption). See also [43]. 
47 Makdessi [258]. 
48 Makdessi [77]. 
49 In relation to validity, see further text to n192. 
50 Text to n198. 
51 Office of Fair Trading v Abbey National plc [2009] UKSC 6, [2010] 1 AC 696 [83] (Lord Phillips). This 
point had “rightly” been conceded by Mr Sumption QC as counsel for the banks. 
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rule] by the simple expedient of making continued entitlement to a sum conditional on 
the absence of breach, if in substance what was achieved was forfeiture upon breach”.52 
In both of these cases the court concluded that the clause was not substantially triggered 
by breach. However, they appear to envisage that it may sometimes be appropriate to 
look past the parties’ unambiguous language. 
The greater the scope for intrusion on grounds of substance, the more closely the 
restated English approach will come to resemble the jurisdictional test proposed by the 
High Court of Australia in Andrews v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group.53 Lord 
Neuberger and Lord Sumption robustly rejected the Australian approach.54 However, 
that test also rested on “a matter of substance”, and although it referred to a “failure of 
the primary stipulation” rather than to “breach”,55 the Supreme Court acknowledged 
that this was a distinction without a difference.56 If substance over form allows the 
English courts to look past the parties’ unambiguous language, then despite the Supreme 
Court’s protestations, there may be much less difference between the restated 
jurisdictional tests in England and Australia than initially assumed.57 
ii) Distinguishing “conditional primary obligations” 
Although Makdessi settles that breach is a necessary requirement for establishing the 
jurisdiction of the penalties rule,58 it also holds that breach is not sufficient. Previous 
authorities appeared to assume that if the impugned clause was conditional on breach 
then no further steps were required to satisfy the jurisdiction stage.59 Rather than 
turning on breach, jurisdiction now turns on whether the clause imposed “a conditional 
primary obligation or a secondary obligation providing a contractual alternative to 
damages at law”.60 Obligations that are created, varied or extinguished by breach may 
thus fall outside the scope of the penalties rule if they can be construed as conditional 
primary obligations.61 However, the new distinction between conditional primary 
                                                        
52 Imam-Sadeque (n16) [203] (Popplewell J), citing Clydebank (n52) 15. 
53 Andrews (n17). 
54 Makdessi [42] (Lord Neuberger and Lord Sumption). 
55 Andrews (n17) [10]. 
56 Makdessi [42] (Lord Neuberger and Lord Sumption), arguing that the High Court of Australia’s “analysis 
assumes that the “primary stipulation” is some kind of promise, in which case its failure is necessarily a 
breach of that promise”. 
57 See further text to n68. 
58 Text to n13. 
59 See eg Jervis (n16) 206 (Millett LJ); Euro London (n40) [27] (Chadwick LJ), discussing the “holding fee” 
clause in Interfoto (n42); M & J Polymers (n39) [41] (Burton J); Imam-Sadeque (n16) [187] (Popplewell J). 
60 Makdessi [14] (Lord Neuberger and Lord Sumption). See also [32] and [73] (Lord Neuberger and Lord 
Sumption). Lord Hodge also agreed with this distinction in principle ([241]). 
61 Makdessi [14] (Lord Neuberger and Lord Sumption) and [270] (Lord Hodge). 
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obligations and secondary obligations creates new uncertainties and leaves several 
existing issues unresolved. 
The definition of a “secondary obligation” is now key to the application of the 
jurisdiction stage. The conventional view, introduced into English law by Diplock LJ,62 
was that “breaches of primary obligations give rise to substituted or secondary 
obligations”.63 On this view, secondary obligations are remedies imposed by law. In 
Makdessi, the Supreme Court departed from this understanding but equivocated over its 
own definition.64 The Justices re-characterised secondary obligations as “security for 
performance”,65 and ““collateral” or “accessional” to the primary obligation”.66 But the 
judgments also refer to the conventional remedial understanding.67 The aim was 
evidently to refashion a test that excluded clauses conditional on breach where the 
relevant obligation was particularly central to the bargain; by contradistinction, 
“secondary obligation” now effectively means “ancillary obligation”, rather than 
specifically a remedial term. 
Both the English and Australian approaches to jurisdiction have now moved away 
from the relatively simple test of whether the clause was triggered by breach. In 
Andrews, the High Court of Australia sought to expand the jurisdiction of the penalties 
rule beyond clauses triggered by breach. In Makdessi, the Supreme Court’s restatement 
had the opposite motivation; it sought to narrow the jurisdictional test to exclude some 
types of clause triggered by breach. However, the resulting formulations are strikingly 
similar. In Australia, jurisdiction now turns on whether the clause was a “collateral or 
accessory stipulation … in the nature of a security” for performance of the primary 
stipulation.68 This formulation is almost indistinguishable from the Supreme Court’s re-
characterisation of a secondary obligation.69 In light of this, Lord Neuberger and Lord 
Sumption should perhaps not have been so quick to denigrate the Australian test.70 
                                                        
62 Czarnikow Ltd v Koufos (The Heron II) [1966] 2 QB 695 (CA) 731-732; Robophone (n62) 1446; Photo 
Production Ltd v Securicor Transport Ltd [1980] AC 827 (HL) 848. The terminology of “primary” and 
“secondary” rights and obligations was originally introduced to English jurisprudence in J Austin, Lectures 
on Jurisprudence or the Philosophy of Positive Law, vol 2, 5th edn (R Campbell ed, London: Murray, 1885) 
762-763; see further B Dickson, “The Contribution of Lord Diplock to the General Law of Contract” (1989) 
9 O.J.L.S. 441. 
63 Photo Production (n62) 848. 
64 As Conte (n3) concludes, “the court’s distinction between primary and secondary obligations does not 
work”: 385. 
65 Makdessi [7] (Lord Neuberger and Lord Sumption). See also [251] (Lord Hodge): “an additional means 
of enforcement”. 
66 Makdessi [13] (Lord Neuberger and Lord Sumption), citing Sloman v Walter (1783) 1 Brown's Chancery 
Cases 418, 28 ER 1213, 1214 (Thurlow LC). 
67 Makdessi [74] (Lord Neuberger and Lord Sumption): "contractual alternative to damages at law"; and 
[241] (Lord Hodge): “remedies for breach of contract”. 
68 Andrews (n17) [10]. 
69 n65 and n66. See also text to n55. 
70 Makdessi [42]. 
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An important issue left unresolved by the restated jurisdiction test concerns 
clauses that impose or vary obligations on the contract-breaker as a result of breach. 
Makdessi holds that clauses stipulating “the consideration promised for a given standard 
of performance” are now outside the penalties rule because they “define the primary 
obligations of the parties”.71 This proposition leaves open a new approach to cases like 
Lordsvale Finance v Bank of Zambia,72 where the clause uplifted the interest rate for 
future loan repayments following a default by the borrower. Colman J assumed that the 
clause was within the jurisdiction of the penalties rule, although he held that the clause 
was not invalid because it was commercially justified.73 However, such clauses may now 
fall outside the scope of the penalties rule altogether, if they can be characterised as 
varying the primary obligation to repay the loan. 
This reanalysis of the Lordsvale uplift clause as a conditional primary obligation 
finds some support from Lord Mance’s judgment in Makdessi. Lord Mance reasoned that 
“In substance, the uplift amounts to a variation of the original terms”, even though the 
“uplift is conditioned on the breach”,74 because “the breach reflects directly upon the 
continuing appropriateness of the originally agreed interest terms”.75 Although these 
considerations point to the characterisation of the clause as a conditional primary 
obligation, they were raised in relation to validity rather than jurisdiction.76 It therefore 
appears that Lord Mance may have regarded the Lordsvale clause as within the 
jurisdiction of the penalties rule even though it was a conditional primary obligation.77 
Lord Mance’s position on the status of conditional primary obligations is unclear 
because his judgment does not distinguish between jurisdiction and validity, or between 
primary and secondary obligations. 
The Lordsvale example demonstrates that although the separation of jurisdiction 
and validity provides a useful analytical tool, in practice there may be some overlap 
between the criteria relevant at each stage. In relation to uplift clauses, if the amount of 
the uplift triggered by breach is relatively small then it may be plausible to regard the 
clause as a renegotiation of the price of the loan, based on the change to the borrowers’ 
credit risk; for the same reason, the clause would probably be valid even if it fell within 
                                                        
71 Makdessi [73] (Lord Neuberger and Lord Sumption). See also [270] (Lord Hodge). 
72 Lordsvale Finance Plc v Bank of Zambia [1996] QB 752. 
73 Lordsvale (n72) 763-774. On commercial justification, see further text to n136. 
74 Makdessi [148]. 
75 Makdessi [148]. See also United International Pictures v Cine Bes Filmcilik ve Yapimcilik AS [2003] EWCA 
Civ 1669, [2004] 1 CLC 401, where the clause may be construed as imposing “terms of settlement which 
provide on default for payment of costs which a party was prepared to forego if the settlement was 
honoured”: Makdessi [152] (Lord Mance). Again, in Cine Bes itself, the Court of Appeal assumed that the 
clause was within the jurisdiction of the penalties rule. 
76 Makdessi [153], holding that such clauses would be upheld “Provided that “interest” protected or “in due 
performance” is understood widely enough to cover an interest in renegotiating the original contractual 
bargain”; these factors refer to the test for validity rather than jurisdiction. 
77 This also appears to have been Lord Mance’s position in relation to the two clauses under consideration 
in the Makdessi appeal itself: see further n99 and n100. 
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the jurisdiction of the penalties rule. Conversely, if the amount of the uplift is very large 
then it may be less plausible to regard the clause as merely renegotiating the price; for 
the same reason, the clause is also likely to be regarded as exorbitant at the validity 
stage. In other words, in practice the proportionality of a clause may be relevant at the 
jurisdiction as well as the validity stage.78 
Another important issue left unresolved concerns clauses that extinguish or vary 
the innocent party’s obligations as a result of breach. The main difficulty arises in 
relation to conditions that have “retrospective” effect, by extinguishing or diminishing 
obligations that have already accrued to the contract-breaker. Such clauses are more 
controversial than those which operate prospectively to prevent obligations that have 
not yet accrued. In Makdessi, Lord Neuberger and Lord Sumption conflated these two 
types of condition in their proposition that “If as a result [of breach] remuneration is 
reduced upon his non-performance, there is no reason to regard that outcome as 
penal”.79 Their analysis suggests that clauses reducing the remuneration payable to the 
contract-breaker are outside the scope of the penalties rule regardless of whether the 
clause operates prospectively or retrospectively. 
It was already established in English law that clauses preventing the prospective 
accrual of obligations are outside the jurisdiction of the penalties rule, even where 
failure of the relevant condition coincides with a breach of contract. In Euro London, 
Chadwick LJ declined to apply the penalties rule to clauses that defined the 
circumstances in which the right to a refund arose, reasoning that “they do not defeat 
the right to refund when it arises, nor any other existing right to refund”.80 Popplewell J 
reached the same conclusion in Imam-Sadeque, holding that “The effect was not that the 
terms … provided for the forfeiture of his shares by reason of breaches of [the contract]. 
The effect was that he never acquired the rights identified”.81 In other words, the 
penalties rule was inapplicable because the impugned clause “conferred a conditional 
benefit … which never accrued because he failed to fulfil the condition”.82 
In Makdessi, Lord Neuberger and Lord Sumption put forward the more 
controversial proposition that conditional primary obligations may be outside the 
jurisdiction of the penalties rule even if the clause retrospectively cancels obligations 
that have already accrued. They gave the example of a “retrospective cesser” clause in an 
insurance contract, which “forfeited an accrued right to indemnity permanently” where 
                                                        
78 On proportionality, see further text to n148. 
79 Makdessi [73]. See also [73]: “the consideration due to [the contract-breaker] may be variable according 
to one or more contingencies, including the contingency of his breach of the contract”. 
80 Euro London (n40) [28]. 
81 Imam-Sadeque (n16) [207]. 
82 Imam-Sadeque (n16) [208]. 
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the insured breached certain obligations.83 Lord Neuberger and Lord Sumption 
suggested that such clauses may fall outside the penalties rule if they determine “the 
consideration promised for a given standard of performance” and thus “define the 
primary obligations of the parties”.84 In proposing this test, the Justices did not draw any 
distinction between the retrospective cesser clause and the separate class of cases 
where the relevant obligation had not yet accrued.85 
The exclusion of retrospective conditions from the jurisdiction of the penalties rule 
is doubtful as a matter of previous authority. Lord Neuberger and Lord Sumption’s 
approach relied solely on a comment by Bingham LJ in The Padre Island;86 however, 
Bingham LJ was in the minority on this point,87 which was also obiter dictum.88 On the 
contrary, in Gilbert Ash v Modern Engineering, the House of Lords assumed that a clause 
fell within the penalties rule where it allowed the innocent party to “withhold payment 
of any monies due or becoming due”, including payment obligations that had already 
accrued to the contract-breaker.89 That assumption was approved by Lord Mance and 
Lord Hodge in Makdessi.90 The Supreme Court was therefore divided on the issue of 
retrospective effect. It seems likely that conditional primary obligations will only be 
excluded from the penalties rule where the condition operates prospectively. 
If the foregoing analysis is correct, the restated jurisdiction test will still turn on a 
further distinction “between contingent rights and accrued rights”.91 This distinction 
may be difficult to draw in complex transactions. For example, in Imam-Sadeque, 
Popplewell J concluded that although the contract-breaker had an accrued beneficial 
interest in the relevant property, he only had a contingent right to the legal title.92 In 
Makdessi itself, Clause 5.1 was construed to have only prospective effect, such that it 
would “only result in the loss of either Payment, if the breach occurs before the payment 
is due”.93 However, this construction was not entirely obvious; the wording of the clause 
                                                        
83 Makdessi [73], citing Socony Mobil Oil Co Inc v The West of England Ship Owners Mutual Insurance 
Association Ltd (The Padre Island), sub nom Firma C-Trade SA v Newcastle Protection and Indemnity 
Association (The Fanti) [1989] 1 Lloyd's Rep 239 (CA). 
84 Makdessi [73] (Lord Neuberger and Lord Sumption). 
85 See eg Else (n23), discussed in Makdessi [72]. 
86 The Padre Island (n83) 254 (Bingham LJ). 
87 The Padre Island (n83) 262 (Stuart-Smith LJ) and 265 (O’Connor LJ). 
88 On the dispositive issue, the Court of Appeal’s decision was subsequently overturned by the House of 
Lords: [1991] 2 AC 1 (HL). 
89 Gilbert Ash (n26) 698 (Lord Reid), 703 (Lord Morris), 711 (Viscount Dilhorne) and 723 (Lord Salmon). 
This point was conceded by counsel. The decision in Giraud UK Ltd v Smith [2000] IRLR 763 (EAT) also 
reflects this assumption. Both cases are discussed in Imam-Sadeque (n16) [219] (Popplewell J). 
90 Makdessi [154]-[155] (Lord Mance) and [226] (Lord Hodge). Lord Mance also doubted Lord Neuberger 
and Lord Sumption’s interpretation of Bingham LJ’s reasoning in The Padre Island (n83) [155]. 
91 Imam-Sadeque (n16) [220]. 
92 Imam-Sadeque (n16) [211]-[212]. 
93 Makdessi [176] (Lord Mance). See also Makdessi v Cavendish Square Holdings BV [2013] EWCA Civ 1540 
[18] (Christopher Clarke LJ). 
13 
 
seems to have been wide enough to encompass payments that had already accrued but 
had not yet been paid at the date of breach.94 In principle, the status of an impugned 
clause must be determined as a matter of construction at the date of contract formation 
rather than in light of events as they subsequently transpired.95 
So, where are we now? Makdessi replaces the relatively straightforward breach 
requirement with an elusive distinction between conditional primary obligations and 
secondary obligations (where “secondary obligation” does not bear its conventional 
meaning). Some clauses that were previously within the jurisdiction of the penalties rule 
– such as the Lordsvale uplift clause,96 or clauses with retrospective effect97 – may 
arguably now fall outside the rule. The new distinction narrows the scope of jurisdiction, 
which may increase parties’ certainty that their clauses will be enforced; however, the 
jurisdiction test itself is less certain than before. To support this proposition, one need 
only look to the application of the restated test in Makdessi: even though the Justices 
were essentially agreed as to the applicable legal test,98 they reached no clear majority 
on one of the clauses under examination,99 and on the other they were split four to 
three.100 
iii) “Retention” clauses 
Makdessi leaves open several issues concerning clauses that enable the innocent party to 
retain property or money upon breach. A retention clause may provide for the retention 
of property, a “deposit”, or instalments of the price. The approaches to these three types 
of retention clause are very difficult to reconcile. Retention of property clauses fall 
outside the jurisdiction of the penalties rule; by contrast, Makdessi establishes that 
“deposit” clauses fall within the rule.101 The status of clauses providing for the retention 
                                                        
94 Clause 5.1 reads: “If a Seller becomes a Defaulting Shareholder he shall not be entitled to receive the 
Interim Payment and/or the Final Payment which would other than for his having become a Defaulting 
Shareholder have been paid to him and the Purchaser's obligations to make such payment shall cease”. 
95 n182 and n183. 
96 Text to n72. 
97 Text to n83. 
98 n60. 
99 Lord Neuberger and Lord Sumption (with whom Lord Carnwath agreed) held that Clause 5.1 was 
outside the jurisdiction of the penalties rule: [74]. Lord Hodge (with whom Lord Toulson and Lord Clarke 
agreed), expressly left the issue open: [270], [291] and [292]. Lord Mance’s view was unclear because 
although he held that the clause amounted “to a reshaping of the parties' primary relationship” ([183]), he 
also applied the validity test without any indication that this stage was superfluous ([181]). 
100 Lord Neuberger and Lord Sumption (with whom Lord Carnwath agreed) held that Clause 5.6 was 
outside the jurisdiction of the penalties rule: [83]. Lord Hodge (with whom Lord Toulson and Lord Clarke 
agreed) held that the clause was covered by the penalties rule: [280], [291] and [292]. Lord Mance’s view 





of instalments of the price remains uncertain. The restated approach may create a 
difficult distinction between deposit and instalment clauses, both of which involve the 
retention of money upon breach. The Supreme Court’s analysis of retention clauses 
overlooks a potentially significant distinction between repudiatory and non-repudiatory 
breaches. 
The status of retention of property clauses is illustrated by two Court of Appeal 
decisions in Jobson v Johnson and Else (1982) v Parkland Holdings.102 Both of these cases 
loosely concerned the forfeiture of shares following a default by the buyer. In Jobson, the 
shares had already been transferred to the buyer (and the clause provided for re-
transfer), whereas in Else, the shares had remained the property of the seller (and the 
clause provided for retention). The penalties rule extended to the re-transfer clause in 
Jobson,103 but not to the retention clause in Else.104 In Makdessi, Lord Mance concluded 
from this distinction that although clauses requiring the contract-breaker to re-transfer 
property to the innocent party may fall within the jurisdiction of the penalties rule,105 
the rule does not cover clauses that provide for retention of property already owned by 
the innocent party on breach.106 
In Else, Evans LJ explained this approach on the basis that “a case where both the 
legal and beneficial property has passed to the purchaser is conceptually different” to 
one in which “the legal interest in the shares had been retained by the plaintiffs until the 
defendants’ payment obligations were discharged”.107 Although admittedly based on a 
“formal distinction”,108 this treatment of retention of property clauses can now be 
understood in terms of a (prospective) conditional primary obligation:109 the accrual of 
the obligation to transfer the property to the buyer is conditional on counter-
performance. However, it follows from the central distinction between conditional 
primary obligations and secondary obligations that if the retention of property clause 
can be construed as “a mere security for performance”110 then it may still fall within the 
jurisdiction of the penalties rule. 
The restated approach to “deposit” clauses is difficult to reconcile with the 
retention of property cases and may now raise the further issue of how to distinguish 
between deposits and instalments of the price. Makdessi confirms that deposit clauses 
                                                        
102 Jobson (n26). 
103 Jobson (n26) 1031-1032 (Dillon LJ) and 1043-1044 (Nicholls LJ). 
104 Else (n23) 136 (Evans LJ) and 144 (Hoffmann LJ). 
105 N28. Cf Makdessi [16] (Lord Neuberger and Lord Sumption), which appears to cast doubt on this 
proposition for proprietary or possessory rights “granted or transferred subject to revocation or 
determination on breach”. 
106 Makdessi [157] and [159]. 
107 Else (n23) 138 (Evans LJ). 
108 Else (n23) 145 (Hoffmann LJ). 




are within the jurisdiction of the penalties rule: “the fact that a sum is paid over by one 
party to the other party as a deposit, in the sense of some sort of surety for the first 
party’s contractual performance, does not prevent the sum being a penalty”.111 Although 
this conclusion is consistent with previous authority,112 it is difficult to reconcile with 
the approach to property in Else,113 because in deposit cases the payment occurs before 
the breach such that the deposit clause merely provides for retention rather than 
transfer of the payment upon breach.114 
The status of clauses that enable a seller to retain instalments of price remains 
unresolved. In Makdessi, Lord Neuberger and Lord Sumption concluded that unlike 
deposits, “retention of instalments which have been paid under contract so as to become 
the absolute property of the vendor does not fall within the penalty rule”.115 However, 
this point was not finally resolved because two of the other Justices expressly reserved 
judgment.116 Previously in Else, the Court of Appeal concluded that a clause providing for 
the retention of instalments was outside the jurisdiction of the penalties rule.117 On the 
other hand, several earlier authorities appear to hold that such clauses may be classified 
as penalties, although the form of relief awarded suggests that the courts may have 
applied relief against forfeiture even though they adopted the terminology of a 
penalty.118 These authorities were largely overlooked in Makdessi.119 
The main basis for distinguishing between deposits and instalments of the price 
appears to be that, unlike instalments, deposits are paid “as security for due 
performance” and therefore constitute a “secondary obligation”.120 A related distinction 
may be that deposits are not transferred to the seller “absolutely”.121 However, as 
                                                        
111 Makdessi [16]. See also [156] (Lord Mance) and [238] (Lord Hodge). 
112 Commissioner of Public Works v Hills [1906] AC 368 (PC) 375-376 (Lord Dunedin); Workers Trust (n26) 
[1993] AC 573 (PC) 579 (Lord Browne-Wilkinson). 
113 n107. 
114 As Conte (n3) argues, “A depositor will forfeit nothing on breach. X cannot forfeit the right to the 
deposit payment, as X transfers that right to Y before X breaches the contract”: 386. 
115 Makdessi [16], citing Else (n23) 146 (Hoffmann LJ) and Stockloser v Johnson [1954] 1 QB 476 (CA). See 
also Cadogan Petroleum Holdings Ltd v Global Process Systems LLC [2013] EWHC 214 (Comm), [2013] 2 
Lloyd's Rep 26 [33] (Eder J), cited in Makdessi [156] (Lord Mance). Lord Neuberger and Lord Sumption 
clarified that a retention of instalment clause may nevertheless be subject to relief against forfeiture: 
Makdessi [16]. 
116 Makdessi [156] and [170] (Lord Mance) and [229] (Lord Hodge). 
117 Else (n23) 136 (Evans LJ) and 144 (Hoffmann LJ). 
118 Re Dagenham (Thames) Dock Co Ex p Hulse (1872-73) LR 8 Ch App 1022 (CA); Kilmer v British Columbia 
Orchard Lands Ltd [1913] AC 319 (PC) 325 (Lord Moulton); Steedman v Drinkle [1916] 1 AC 275 (PC) 279 
(Viscount Haldane). 
119 Lord Neuberger and Lord Sumption ([42]) did acknowledge the decision in Re Dagenham (Thames) 
Dock Co Ex p Hulse (1872-73) LR 8 Ch App 1022 (CA) but they sought to distinguish it as a case of relief 
against forfeiture. 
120 Else (n23) 146 (Hoffmann LJ), cited in Makdessi [16] (Lord Neuberger and Lord Sumption). 
121 Stockloser (n115) 489 (Denning LJ); Else (n23) 146 (Hoffmann LJ). 
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Hoffmann LJ acknowledged in Else, “It may sometimes be hard to say whether a contract 
is providing for forfeiture of money paid absolutely or for a penal liability which is being 
set off against money due”.122 In practice, the primary way of differentiating between 
deposits and instalments may be by reference to the size of the sum retained.123 
Consequently, if the distinction drawn by Lord Neuberger and Lord Sumption is correct, 
it further illustrates that in practice the proportionality of the stipulation is likely to be 
relevant at the jurisdiction as well as the validity stage.124 
The Supreme Court’s analysis of retention clauses overlooks a potentially 
significant distinction between repudiatory and non-repudiatory breaches. This 
distinction concerns the legal position that would obtain in the absence of the clause. In 
Else, Evans LJ reasoned that in considering jurisdiction over the impugned clauses 
(which provided for the retention of both property and instalments of the price), it was 
necessary to take account of “the right which an unpaid vendor has, or may have, to 
rescind (meaning to terminate) the contract of sale if the buyer commits a repudiatory 
breach”.125 On the facts, the clauses were “no more than an express statement of what in 
any event would have been [the innocent party’s] right to rescind the contract”.126 The 
retention clauses thus fell outside the penalties rule because they did not affect the legal 
position that would have obtained anyway under the common law. 
The explanation put forward in Else leaves open whether retention clauses may be 
characterised differently where they enable the seller to retain property or money in 
response to a non-repudiatory breach. However, other authorities do not appear to 
recognise this distinction. In Imam-Sadeque, Popplewell J held that the impugned clause 
was outside the penalties rule even though it allowed for the retention of property for a 
non-repudiatory breach.127 This approach goes further than the reasoning in Else 
because the innocent party would not have been able to retain the property at common 
law in the absence of any right to terminate the contract.128 In Lombard North Central v 
Butterworth, Mustill LJ held that the penalties rule did not cover clauses that expressly 
designate minor obligations as “conditions”,129 even though such clauses may be 
functionally equivalent to retention clauses in that they create a right to terminate for 
breaches that would otherwise be non-repudiatory. 
                                                        
122 Else (n23) 146 (Hoffmann LJ). 
123 Another way may be by reference to the timing of the payment relative to other payments. 
124 See also text following n77. On proportionality, see further text to n148. 
125 Else (n23) 136. 
126 Else (n23) 144. 
127 Imam-Sadeque (n16) [224]. Popplewell J also refused to “read down” the clause such that it covered 
only repudiatory breaches. 
128 In other words, the contract-breaker could still have completed performance and thereby secured the 
accrual of the right to receive the property. 




A. What we know 
We now know that validity does not depend on establishing that the stipulated sum (or 
other consequence) was compensatory: “A damages clause may properly be justified by 
some other consideration than the desire to recover compensation for a breach”.130 In 
particular, “commercial interests may justify the imposition upon a breach of contract of 
a financial burden which cannot either be related directly to loss caused by the breach or 
justified by reference to the impossibility of assessing such loss”.131 This conclusion 
entailed a rejection of the dichotomy between a genuine pre-estimate of loss and a 
penalty.132 The modern preoccupation with the genuine pre-estimate of loss test had 
mistakenly developed from a “quasi-statutory”133 interpretation of Lord Dunedin’s test 
in Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre v New Garage & Motor Co Ltd.134 
We now also know that a clause may be valid even though it aimed to deter 
breach.135 Although previous authorities had sometimes departed from the genuine pre-
estimate of loss test where the clause was “commercially justified”,136 it was widely held 
that a clause would be invalid if “the predominant contractual function of the provision 
was to deter”.137 In Makdessi, the Supreme Court held that this understanding rested on 
another false dichotomy between commercial justification and deterrence.138 A majority 
emphasised that deterrent clauses were not “inherently penal or contrary to the policy 
of the law”139 because they were “simply one species of provision designed to influence 
                                                        
130 Makdessi [28] (Lord Neuberger and Lord Sumption). See also [23]. 
131 Makdessi [145] (Lord Mance). See also [143] and [152]. 
132 Makdessi [225] (Lord Hodge). Lord Neuberger and Lord Sumption referred to previous authorities as 
“the prisoner of artificial categorisation”: [31]. See also [145] and [152] (Lord Mance). 
133 Makdessi [22] (Lord Neuberger and Lord Sumption). 
134 Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co Ltd v New Garage & Motor Co Ltd [1915] AC 79 (HL) 87-88. The weight 
placed on Lord Dunedin’s judgment was unwarranted: Makdessi [21]-[24] (Lord Neuberger and Lord 
Sumption), [135]-[139] (Lord Mance) and [220]-[221] (Lord Hodge). 
135 On the facts of the Makdessi and ParkingEye appeals, the Supreme Court unanimously held that all of 
the clauses under examination were valid despite that they aimed to deter breaCh 
136 Lordsvale (n72) 763-764 (Colman J); Cine Bes (n75) [15] (Mance LJ), Murray v Leisureplay plc [2005] 
EWCA Civ 963, [2005] IRLR 946 [46] (Arden LJ), [106] (Clarke LJ) and [117] (Buxton LJ); Imam-Sadeque 
(n16) [196] (Popplewell J). 
137 Lordsvale (n72) 762 (Colman J), cited with approval in: Cine Bes (n75) [13] (Mance LJ); Murray (n136) 
[106] (Clarke LJ) and [110] (Buxton LJ) See also Imam-Sadeque (n16) [189] (Popplewell J). In Makdessi v 
Cavendish Square Holdings BV [2013] EWCA Civ 1540 [120]-[121] (Christopher Clarke LJ), this reasoning 
led the Court of Appeal to conclude that both clauses were invalid. 
138 Makdessi [31] (Lord Neuberger and Lord Sumption) and [221] (Lord Hodge). See also [28] (Lord 
Neuberger and Lord Sumption), arguing that deterrence and commercial justification may coincide. 
139 Makdessi [31] (Lord Neuberger and Lord Sumption). See also [285] (Lord Hodge). Lord Mance’s 
position was less clear: he appeared to suggest that a clause may be invalid if it is “in its nature a 
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the conduct of the party potentially affected”.140 This approach explains why deposit 
clauses, which overtly serve to enforce performance (and thereby to deter breach), may 
nevertheless pass the validity test.141 
The restated test for validity now centres on the interrelated concepts of legitimate 
interest, exorbitance and unconscionability. On this approach, “The true test is whether 
the impugned provision is a secondary obligation which imposes a detriment on the 
contract-breaker out of all proportion to any legitimate interest of the innocent party in 
the enforcement of the primary obligation”.142 An important implication of the restated 
test, compared with the previous understanding, is that “deterrence is not penal if there 
is a legitimate interest in influencing the conduct of the contracting party which is not 
satisfied by the mere right to recover damages”.143 The legitimate interest test was said 
to be supported by the early authorities on penalties,144 most notably by Lord Atkinson’s 
reasoning in Dunlop, which was based on “the innocent party's interest in the 
performance of the relevant obligation”.145 
The courts must also apply a supplementary test involving the concepts of 
exorbitance and unconscionability.146 The test is “whether, assuming [a legitimate] 
interest to exist, the provision made for the interest is nevertheless in the circumstances 
extravagant, exorbitant or unconscionable”.147 The assessment of exorbitance and 
unconscionability will depend on the proportionality of the stipulation compared with 
the innocent party’s legitimate interests.148 In applying this test, the court should not 
impose “too stringent a standard”.149 Extravagance, exorbitance and unconscionability 
will usually amount to the same thing.150 If this is correct, the myriad of terms all 
effectively depend on the concept of disproportionality. The only firm outer boundary of 
validity concerns clauses that aim to punish the contract-breaker, because “The innocent 
                                                                                                                                                                             
punishment for or deterrent to breach” ([148]) but nevertheless upheld the clause in the ParkingEye 
appeal despite expressly acknowledging that it was intended to have a “deterrent element” ([198]). 
140 Makdessi [31]. See also [248] (Lord Hodge). 
141 Makdessi [16] (Lord Neuberger and Lord Sumption) and [234] (Lord Hodge). 
142 Makdessi [32]. See also [28], requiring “a legitimate interest in performance extending beyond the 
prospect of pecuniary compensation”. 
143 Makdessi [99]. 
144 Makdessi [23]-[24], citing Clydebank (n52) 19-20 (Lord Robertson); Dunlop (n134) 92 (Lord Atkinson). 
145 Makdessi [23] (Lord Neuberger and Lord Sumption), citing Dunlop (n134) 91-92 (Lord Atkinson). See 
also [137] and [179] (Lord Mance). 
146 Makdessi [31] (Lord Neuberger and Lord Sumption), [162] (Lord Mance) and [244] (Lord Hodge). 
These terms appear to originate in Clydebank (n52) 10 (Lord Halsbury) and were adopted in Dunlop 
(n134) 87 (Lord Dunedin), 95 (Lord Atkinson) and 101 (Lord Parmoor). 
147 Makdessi [152] (Lord Mance). See also [255] (Lord Hodge) and [293] (Lord Toulson). 
148 Makdessi [249] and [255]. See also [32] (Lord Neuberger and Lord Sumption): “out of all proportion”. 
149 Makdessi [248]. 
150 Makdessi [31] (Lord Neuberger and Lord Sumption), [152] (Lord Mance) and [293] (Lord Toulson). 
19 
 
party can have no proper interest in simply punishing the defaulter”.151 In other words, 
punishment will always be disproportionate. 
B. Unresolved issues 
i) The scope of “legitimate interest” 
The concept of “legitimate interest” now features in several doctrines in the law of 
damages. In relation to the tests for recovery of the agreed sum,152 the availability of 
specific performance,153 and the exceptional imposition of disgorgement damages,154 its 
application has proved far from straightforward. Makdessi alludes only briefly to these 
other doctrines;155 it appears that the legitimate interest test as applied to the penalties 
rule is essentially freestanding. Although the Supreme Court sought to ground the 
restated test in the early authorities on penalties,156 guidance on the scope of legitimate 
interest is likely to be derived mainly if not exclusively from its application to the 
Makdessi and ParkingEye appeals themselves. These appeals reveal several unresolved 
issues. 
The first main issue is: legitimate interest in what? A majority of the Supreme 
Court referred to the “legitimate interest of the innocent party in the enforcement of the 
primary obligation”.157 Such interests need not be commercial.158 On this approach, not 
only does the penalties rule now permit an interest in deterrence, it affirmatively 
grounds the relevant interest in the aim of deterring breach. In other words, it recasts 
valid clauses as prophylactic enforcements of primary obligations rather than as an 
agreed remedies for breach. This approach flips the old understanding on its head.159 
                                                        
151 Makdessi [32]. See also [31]: “The real question when a contractual provision is challenged as a penalty 
is whether it is penal”. 
152 White & Carter (Councils) Ltd v McGregor [1962] AC 413 (HL) 431 (Lord Reid); Isabella Shipowner SA v 
Shagang Shipping Co Ltd (The Aquafaith) [2012] EWHC 1077 (Comm), [2012] 2 All ER (Comm) 461 [9]-
[26] (Cooke J). 
153 Cooperative Insurance Society Ltd v Argyll Stores (Holdings) Ltd [1998] AC 1 (HL) 18 (Lord Hoffmann). 
154 Attorney General v Blake [2001] 1 AC 268 (HL) 285 (Lord Nicholls) and 293 (Lord Hobhouse); 
Experience Hendrix LLC v PPX Enterprises Inc [2003] EWCA Civ 323, [2003] 1 All ER (Comm) 830 [35] 
(Mance LJ). 
155 Makdessi [29]-[30] (Lord Neuberger and Lord Sumption). 
156 N144. 
157 Makdessi [32] (Lord Neuberger and Lord Sumption) and [28], requiring “a legitimate interest in 
performance extending beyond the prospect of pecuniary compensation”. See also [255] (Lord Hodge), 
with whom Lord Toulson expressly agreed on this point): referring to “the innocent party's interest in the 
performance of the contract”. 
158 Makdessi [249] (Lord Hodge). 
159 See eg Imam-Sadeque (n16) [202] (Popplewell J): “A penalty clause is a clause which, without 
commercial justification … [is] designed to secure performance of the contract rather than to compensate 
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However, the legitimate interest need not always be in securing enforcement because 
Lord Mance held that the test also encompassed “an interest in renegotiating the original 
contractual bargain in the light of the situation after or revealed by the breach”;160 this 
interest is remedial and operates on the hypothesis that enforcement of the original 
obligation has failed. 
The residual significance of the genuine pre-estimate of loss test is unclear. The 
test is obviously no longer decisive, but Lord Hodge indicated that it would remain an 
important yardstick for clauses “fixing the level of damages to be paid on breach”.161 
Similarly, Lord Neuberger and Lord Sumption held that “In the case of a straightforward 
damages clause, [a legitimate] interest will rarely extend beyond compensation for the 
breach”, such that Lord Dunedin’s four tests in Dunlop will remain relevant.162 However, 
the ParkingEye appeal demonstrates that straightforward stipulations to pay money 
need not be compensatory.163 Makdessi thus leaves unresolved how judges should 
distinguish an agreed damages clause (where the genuine pre-estimate of loss test 
remains relevant) from other stipulations to pay money (where a broader range of 
legitimate interests may be invoked). 
Makdessi raises the possibility that agreed disgorgement clauses may now be 
enforceable. Such clauses would have been the archetype of an invalid penalty under the 
previous authorities; however, they now seem well-placed to pass the legitimate interest 
test.  Although Attorney General v Blake required “a legitimate interest in preventing the 
defendant's profit-making activity” in order to establish disgorgement damages at 
common law,164 the validity of an agreed disgorgement clause may be wider. In 
particular, the penalties rule only requires a legitimate interest in deterring breach, not 
a legitimate interest in preventing profits being made from the breach. On the other 
hand, the issue whether the likely profits were proportionate to the interest in 
deterrence may be more difficult to answer.165 
The second main issue is: whose legitimate interest counts? Given that the 
penalties rule applies to private disputes between contracting parties, one might have 
expected that the test would be confined to the legitimate interest of the party seeking to 
invoke the clause. However, this argument was robustly rejected in the ParkingEye 
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appeal.166 The restated test for validity can additionally take into account the interests of 
third parties and even society as a whole,167 including where one of the contracting 
parties was unaware of the relevant interests.168 Reliance on public interest is not 
entirely without precedent: in Lordsvale, Colman J referred to the “great disservice to 
international banking” if the clause was not enforced.169 This type of consideration may 
assume greater importance following the Makdessi decision. 
The flexibility of the legitimate interest test is demonstrated by the ParkingEye 
appeal. The case concerned a contractual licence imposing an £85 charge on any 
motorist who overstayed the permitted two hours’ free parking in a public car park.170 
Although the charge fell within the jurisdiction of the penalties rule,171 the Supreme 
Court held that it was valid for two main reasons.172 First, the charge served to ensure 
the “efficient use of parking space in the interests of the retail outlets, and of the users of 
those outlets”.173 Second, the charge provided “an income stream to enable ParkingEye 
to meet the costs of operating the scheme and make a profit from its services, without 
which those services would not be available”.174 This reasoning sheds important light on 
the scope of the legitimate interest test. 
The relevant interest need not be the claimant’s interest. The Supreme Court 
reasoned that the £85 charge, which deterred motorists from staying longer than two 
hours,175 served the interests of the retailers who owned the shops around the car park 
and also the public at large.176 However, neither of these groups were parties to the 
contract.177 ParkingEye, the contracting party that operated the car park, did not share 
the interest in enforcement. As Lord Neuberger and Lord Sumption acknowledged, “On 
the contrary, at least if the £85 is payable, [ParkingEye] gains by the unauthorised use, 
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since its revenues are wholly derived from the charges for breach of the terms”.178 In 
other words, ParkingEye’s interest was in profiting from breach of the primary 
obligation, not in securing its enforcement.179 
The contract-breaker need not be aware of the interests served by the clause. The 
interests invoked by the Supreme Court cannot have been apparent to individual 
motorists on entering the car park. Even if one regards the retail and public interest in 
enforcement as self-evident,180 motorists could certainly not be expected to realise the 
importance of the charge to ParkingEye’s business model. In answer to a different point, 
it was accepted that “the question whether a contractual provision is a penalty turns on 
the construction of the contract, which cannot normally turn on facts not recorded in the 
contract unless they are known, or could reasonably be known, to both parties”.181 
Although this point about construction has been widely affirmed,182 including in 
Makdessi itself,183 it seems to contradict the legitimate interests relied upon in the 
ParkingEye appeal. 
The Supreme Court took judicial notice of the fact that the parking scheme 
operated by ParkingEye was in the public interest. In other words, it assumed that the 
social costs and benefits of a scheme providing free parking funded by a minority of 
overstayers was overall preferable to alternative parking schemes. The Justices did not 
marshal any evidence in support of this (unanimous) view, nor did they justify its 
distributional implications. This article does not seek to evaluate that decision, besides 
noting the established concern that the courtroom may not the best place to make policy 
choices about community welfare.184 However, it would be unusual, at least within 
contract law, if such conclusions were allowed to trump the outcome that would be 
reached if balancing the interests of the contracting parties alone. For better or worse, it 
seems that judges must now be prepared to engage (for the first time)185 directly with 
public interest arguments in applying the penalties rule. 
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So, where are we now? The legitimate interest test is much broader than the 
previous test for validity, even under the “commercial justification” approach.186 
Although the restated test now refers to the “legitimate interest of the innocent party in 
the enforcement of the primary obligation”,187 its application in the ParkingEye appeal 
reveals a more liberal approach. The clause may be valid even though the innocent 
party’s interest was in breach rather than enforcement,188 even though the “legitimate 
interest” was attributable exclusively to third parties and society as a whole,189 and even 
though the contract-breaker was probably unaware of the interests at the time of 
contracting.190 The legitimate interest test therefore appears to function effectively as a 
general test of “reasonableness”.191 Just as in relation to the jurisdiction stage, the 
restatement serves to increase the parties’ prospective certainty that their clauses will 
be enforced, but it leaves the test of validity itself in a less certain state. 
ii) The boundary of punishment 
The outer boundary of validity is now said to be marked by a prohibition on 
punishment. Lord Neuberger and Lord Sumption held that “The innocent party can have 
no proper interest in simply punishing the defaulter. His interest is in performance or in 
some appropriate alternative to performance”.192 Lord Hodge similarly concluded that 
“The rule against penalties is a rule of contract law based on public policy … the public 
policy is that the courts will not enforce a stipulation for punishment for breach of 
contract”.193 The emphasis on punishment appears to replace two discredited 
dichotomies194 with another dichotomy, this time “between a reasonable commercial 
condition on the one hand and a punishment on the other”.195 The restated dichotomy is 
likely to raise new problems because it is doubtful whether the concept of punishment 
succeeds in capturing every clause that might be regarded as invalid, especially in 
relation to clauses imposed by commercial parties. 
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The facts of the Makdessi appeal provide the false impression that punishment 
offers a workable universal test for validity. In that case, the Supreme Court reasoned 
that the boundary of punishment had not been crossed because “the price formula in 
clause 5.6 had a legitimate function which had nothing to do with punishment and 
everything to do with achieving [the innocent party’s] commercial objective”.196 
Consequently, “the terms were harsh; but they were not exorbitant. They were not a 
punishment”.197 On the facts of Makdessi, the dichotomy between legitimate deterrence 
and punishment seemed workable because the breach involved personal disloyalty by 
the contract-breaker, which threatened the goodwill value of the innocent party’s 
business; although punishment was not established on the facts, it was at least plausible 
in the circumstances. However, in this respect, Makdessi is likely to be the exception 
rather than the norm. 
In most commercial contexts, punishment will be an implausible aim even where 
the relevant stipulation is (on other grounds) obviously exorbitant. For example, 
suppose that ParkingEye had set its parking charge at £300. The Supreme Court 
emphasised that it “could not charge a sum which would be out of all proportion to its 
interest”;198 presumably £300 would cross that threshold. But could this charge be 
described as “punishment”? The more natural objection seems to be that this type of 
clause is designed to allow one party to profit from the others’ breach.  However, this is 
precisely the kind of conduct that the Supreme Court sanctioned in ParkingEye.199 Most 
“penalty” clauses inserted by commercial parties will be seeking additional profits 
rather than punishment. If so, the restated dichotomy may again prove unreliable in 
determining which stipulations are exorbitant. 
In circumstances where punishment cannot provide an appropriate boundary, 
there are no clear criteria for assessing the proportionality of the stipulation compared 
with the legitimate interest of the innocent party. Lord Toulson frankly conceded that “it 
is impossible to lay down abstract rules … because it depends on the particular facts and 
circumstances established in the individual case”.200 Lord Hodge similarly concluded 
that “the question is ultimately a value judgment by the court”.201 In determining the 
ParkingEye appeal, all of the Justices relied on parking industry standards as a factor 
contributing to their conclusion that the £85 charge was not exorbitant.202 Industry 
standards may sometimes provide a useful benchmark, particularly where they have 
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been set by an authoritative or democratically accountable body.203 However, in other 
circumstances, reliance on the prevailing industry practice may allow infelicitous 
industries to pull themselves up by their own bootstraps. 
iii) The weight of procedural considerations 
Although it is clear that procedural considerations can have at least some weight both 
for and against validity, the difficult question is how much. The survival of the penalties 
rule is attributable partly to the concern that current statutory protections are 
insufficiently comprehensive to guard against the risk of procedural unfairness.204 In 
particular, the Supreme Court expressed a clear concern about the risk of inequality of 
bargaining power between small and large businesses.205 These procedural concerns, 
regarding the process by which the bargain was reached (rather than the substance of 
the bargain itself), may be raised at the validity stage through the concept of 
unconscionability.206 Lord Mance robustly rejected the submission that the 
unconscionability element of the validity test should be limited to egregious procedural 
misconduct such as duress, undue influence or misrepresentation.207 Instead, at least 
some of the judges thought that unconscionability could encompass broader 
considerations of procedural unfairness.208 
Procedural considerations may play an affirmative role in upholding the validity of 
an impugned clause. In particular, “In a negotiated contract between properly advised 
parties of comparable bargaining power, the strong initial presumption must be that the 
parties themselves are the best judges of what is legitimate”.209 This follows the 
approach taken in Philips v Attorney General of Hong Kong, where Lord Woolf held that 
“especially in commercial contracts”, the starting point is that “what the parties have 
agreed should normally be upheld”.210 Even though the rule against penalties ultimately 
marks a derogation from freedom of contract, the jurisdiction and validity tests are both 
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clearly conditioned by that principle.211 It follows from this “strong initial presumption” 
that despite the rejection of a formal exception for commercial transactions,212 in 
practice commercial parties will often be able to invoke procedural considerations in 
favour of validity. 
The affirmative role of procedural considerations played an important role in both 
the Makdessi and ParkingEye appeals. In Makdessi, all of the Justices invoked the parties’ 
equal bargaining power as a reason for upholding the impugned clauses. The clauses 
were “part of a carefully constructed contract which had been the subject of detailed 
negotiations over many months between two sophisticated commercial parties, dealing 
with each other on an equal basis”.213 In ParkingEye, procedural considerations were 
also invoked in favour of validity even though the parties were plainly not of equal 
bargaining power because the car park notice was a classic “take-it-or-leave-it” offer on 
standard terms. Instead, the court emphasised the transparency of the notice and the 
opportunity for motorists to use other parking facilities if they wished.214 
Although it is clear that procedural considerations can be raised by both sides at 
the validity stage, the relative weight to be accorded to procedural and substantive 
considerations remains unresolved. Lord Neuberger and Lord Sumption’s sweeping 
proposition that “the modern rule is substantive, not procedural”215 is plainly too strong, 
because all of the Justices invoked procedural considerations in their reasoning.216 More 
precisely, procedural unfairness is not necessary to trigger invalidity,217 but procedural 
considerations remain important. The “strong initial presumption” approach suggests 
that affirmative evidence of procedural fairness may weigh heavily enough to turn a 
substantively dubious clause into one that passes the validity test. The weight of 
procedural concerns is less clear; in other words, it remains open whether a dubious 
bargaining process might justify striking down a clause that would otherwise be 
regarded as proportionate to the innocent party’s legitimate interest. 
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A. Where the rule applies 
One of the most significant aspects of Makdessi was in settling the legal effect of the 
penalties rule, even though this issue did not arise on the facts of either appeal. We now 
know that where the penalties rule applies, the clause is “wholly unenforceable”.218 In 
other words, judges do not have the power to “scale down” an invalid clause so as to 
remove just the penal element. Although all of the clauses in the Makdessi and 
ParkingEye appeals were held to be valid, the Justices’ comments on the effect of the 
penalties rule represents strong obiter dicta sufficient to settle the issue for subsequent 
cases.219 However, this clarification effectively raises the stakes at the jurisdiction and 
validity stages; in practice, the restated approach may well create a feedback loop that 
makes it even less likely that the penalties rule will be held to apply. 
Previous uncertainty as to the effect of the penalties rule can be traced to the 
decision in Jobson, where the Court of Appeal held that a penalty clause could be “scaled 
down” to the extent of the penal element.220 In that case, Nicholls LJ proposed that “In 
the case of a penalty clause in a contract equity relieves by cutting down the extent to 
which the contractual obligation is enforceable”.221 The application of this approach on 
the facts of Jobson itself was exceedingly complicated; in light of present developments, 
it does not merit detailed review.222 In summary, Nicholls LJ and Dillon LJ held that the 
contract-breaker could choose between two alternative options for relief,223 whilst Kerr 
LJ (dissenting) would have offered a third.224 This convoluted outcome may be explained 
by the fact that relief against forfeiture was unavailable for purely procedural 
reasons.225 
More recent decisions had indicated willingness to follow the scaling-down 
approach.226 In Makdessi itself, the Court of Appeal supported the Jobson decision in 
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principle.227 However, this position conflicted with earlier authorities. In Financings Ltd 
v Baldock, Diplock LJ held that “Whatever may have been the position before the fusion 
of law and equity, the effect today … is that the penalty clause is treated as void and the 
plaintiff is forced to rely upon his right to such measure of damages as he would be 
entitled to at common law”.228 Diplock LJ persisted with this exposition in several other 
decisions.229 Nevertheless, the potential for uncertainty was still latent in these 
authorities because the resulting damages award could equally be explained as partial 
enforcement of the penalty clause rather than as a reversion to the subsisting claim for 
damages at common law. 
Makdessi brings clarity to this issue by settling decisively that an invalid penalty 
clause is wholly unenforceable. With the exception of Lord Mance, who expressly 
reserved judgment,230 the Justices were agreed that Jobson should be overruled as to the 
effect of the penalties rule.231 In this connection, Lord Neuberger and Lord Sumption 
cited with approval the proposition of Hoffmann LJ in Else that the penalties rule is 
“mechanical in effect and involves no exercise of discretion at all”.232 Their reasoning, in 
essence, was that if partial enforcement was permitted then it would require judges to 
“undertake an unfamiliar role”.233 The courts have no power to rewrite the parties’ 
bargain by substituting into the contract a scaled-down version of the invalid penalty 
clause.234 
Where a penalty clause provides for the payment of an exorbitant sum of money, 
its unenforceability is unlikely to raise significant problems because the innocent party 
will still be able to recover any losses caused by the breach through its subsisting claim 
for damages at common law. However, unenforceability may have more complex 
implications in relation to “non-classic” clauses,235 because where the clause does not 
provide for the payment of money and is not compensatory, “There is no fall-back 
position at common law, as there is in the case of a damages clause”.236 The 
consequences of unenforceability for the innocent party may then be quite drastic 
because the court will have not have any power to order a compromise position. In 
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practice, this effect of the penalties rule may make judges all the more reluctant to apply 
the rule in the first place. 
The feedback loop between effect and application created by the restated approach 
is illustrated by the Makdessi appeal. The Supreme Court upheld the validity of a clause 
that granted the innocent party an option to purchase shares from the contract-breaker 
following breach.237 In holding that the clause was outside the jurisdiction of the 
penalties rule, Lord Neuberger and Lord Sumption reasoned that the option to purchase 
the shares must be characterised as “among the parties’ primary obligations” because 
the application of the penalties rule would involve “making a new contract for the 
parties”; in particular, it would enable the contract-breaker to retain an interest in a 
company to which he had been disloyal, contrary to the commercial purpose of the 
agreement.238 The fact that the clause would be wholly unenforceable if the penalties 
rule applied therefore contributed to the conclusion that the clause must be outside the 
jurisdiction of the rule. 
B. Where the rule does not apply 
Where the penalties rule does not apply, the court may sometimes have a limited power 
to achieve a compromise position by applying the equitable doctrine of relief against 
forfeiture. We now know that the penalties rule and relief against forfeiture can be 
applied sequentially; judges need not choose between a “penalty clause” or a “forfeiture 
clause”.239 Where applicable, relief against forfeiture effectively gives the contract-
breaker a second chance to perform. However, the scope of this compromise position is 
limited in two important respects. First, it will only assist the contract-breaker in 
relation to retention clauses; no compromise position is available where the clause 
requires the contract-breaker to pay money or to transfer property. Second, relief 
against forfeiture is only available for the forfeiture of proprietary or possessory rights; 
Makdessi leaves this limitation on the rule untouched.240 
Where the application of the penalties rule is denied at the jurisdiction stage on the 
basis that the clause imposes a conditional primary obligation rather than a secondary 
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obligation, the contract-breaker may be liable to pay damages in addition to having the 
clause enforced against it. Conditional primary obligations are regarded as part of the 
original agreement rather than as an agreed remedy that displaces the common law 
response to breach;241 it follows from this that “damages are in principle recoverable in 
addition”.242 In practice, enforcement of the clause may be held to have wiped out the 
innocent party’s loss. However, in Makdessi, Lord Neuberger and Lord Sumption left this 
issue of abatement unresolved, holding that “It is an open question whether the right to 
a price reduction would go to abate any loss recoverable by [the innocent party] if they 
had suffered any”.243 
It also follows from the conditional primary obligation analysis that other remedial 
mechanisms could be upheld alongside the impugned clause. At first instance in 
Makdessi, Burton J upheld the clauses, but imposed a condition on their enforcement 
that the innocent party should repay a sum that it had already received under a Part 36 
offer of compensation for the breach.244 Whether or not this approach was correct 
depends on the stage at which the impugned clauses were upheld. If they were properly 
upheld at the jurisdiction stage, on the basis that they constituted conditional primary 
obligations, then the condition was misplaced; by contrast, if the clauses were upheld 
only at the validity stage, after holding that the clauses created secondary obligations, 
then the condition was correctly imposed. Unfortunately, this point was not debated in 
detail because the Court of Appeal overturned the condition and the issue was not 
pursued in the Supreme Court.245 
V. CONCLUSION 
The penalties rule has not been abolished, but its scope has been narrowed at both the 
jurisdiction and validity stages. This article offers no comment on the merits of that 
development; academic evaluations of this “blatant interference with freedom of 
contract”246 already abound. However, even if the rule is now regarded only as a 
backstop for the most egregious clauses,247 it is important ask what scope remains for 
litigation in this field. The aim of this article has thus been to highlight several 
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unresolved issues that are likely to arise in the relatively few instances where a 
plausible case for applying the rule can still be made. The central argument has been 
that although the restated approach serves to increase parties’ certainty that their 
clauses will be enforced, the new legal tests are less clear and workable than the ones 
that they replaced. 
Of the unresolved issues, some tend towards a further narrowing of the rule. The 
flexibility of the distinction between conditional primary obligations and secondary 
obligations leaves open the opportunity to exclude several types of clause whose status 
presently remains uncertain. Likewise, the flexibility of the legitimate interest test 
leaves open that it could mean almost anything at all, given that the boundary of 
punishment will very rarely be reached. On the other hand, other unresolved issues may 
offer the opportunity to re-expand the rule. If the substance over form test is applied 
more intrusively than the ordinary process of construction demands, then in 
appropriate cases jurisdiction could still be cast quite widely. Likewise, the door remains 
open to rely on procedural concerns at the validity stage so as to regulate clauses that 
are the product of unfair bargaining processes. 
The process of narrowing without abolishing the rule against penalties has created 
several new problems that may not be apparent from a cursory reading of the new 
leading authority or from early academic analyses of that decision. It may be some time 
before these unresolved issues can be hammered out on the anvil of concrete cases, 
because the general direction of travel indicated by the Supreme Court in Makdessi will 
be sufficient to warn most contracting parties not to invoke the restated rule lightly. 
Nevertheless, an awareness of these issues will remain of some importance to those 
faced with drafting clauses or advising contract-breakers on their chances of success. 
